There cannot be security and stability in the world without Russia
New York Times
20 April 1999
By Jack F. Matlock
NATO intensifies its bombing of Serbia to the cheers of a fair portion of the Western political and intellectual elite. The bombing has rallied Serbs behind their dictator, Slobodan Milosevic, who is using the air strikes as a cover and pretext for mass expulsions, massacres and hostage taking. As NATO bombing continues, outrages against the Kosovars seem certain to continue. The weapons used against the Kosovars are not easily countered from the air.
The air war is clearly making things worse on the ground – much worse, infact, so pressures build to use ground troops. If they had been available for intervention from the start of the bombing, they might well have served both as a deterrent to Mr. Milosevic and as real protection for the Kosovars if that deterrence failed.
But they were not available, and it will be weeks before they could be, even if NATO governments decide today to accept the political risk of sending them. By the time a few hundred thousand troops could be assembled to invade, Kosovo would probably be emptied of civilian Kosovars, except for those forced to become human shields for Serbian forces dug into arugged terrain.
The Clinton Administration seems unwilling to admit the obvious: that NATObombing has been an unmitigated disaster for all the parties we set out to protect. So far, the only gainers have been Mr. Milosevic and his henchmen, whose support in Serbia, once wobbly, is now solid.
Will that change if bombing continues, on and on and on? Perhaps. But don’t count on it.
So long as Mr. Milosevic can pose as the ultimate barrier to the loss of the sacred ground of Kosovo, a Serbian patriot set upon by more powerful foreign bullies, few Serbs will take the risk of opposing him.
Any successful strategy for peace depends on splitting the Serbian people from Mr. Milosevic’s leadership. Waging war against Serbia as a whole has the opposite effect.
The negative reaction in Russia to NATO’s attack was predictable. After all, we had assured Russia during the debate on NATO enlargement that there was nothing to fear. NATO, we said, was a purely defensive alliance, constitutionally incapable of undertaking offensive military action. (We had earlier given Mikhail Gorbachev to understand that NATO’s borders would not be moved further east if Germany were allowed to unite and stay in NATO.)
Now Russians are asking, Who’s next? Will Moscow be bombed if the war heats up again in Chechnya?
The antics of those Russian politicians talking irresponsibly of military support for Serbia, or a union of Serbia, Belarus and Russia, can be dismissed as lunatic ravings. They are symptoms of a feeling of weakness and humiliation, the irresponsible rhetoric of politicians who need issues in the coming election to distract public attention from their failures to deliver on campaign promises.
Nevertheless, while such posturing may have no practical effect on military operations in the Balkans, the emotions it exploits will complicate and delay the development of democratic institutions and economic reforms in Russia. It also increases Russian resistance to further reduction of nuclear weapons.
Russian official policy, as distinct from the emotional rhetoric that now poisons the air, has actually been moderate and responsible.
Russia was willing to join others in a diplomatic effort to deter ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, but held fast throughout to three positions: 1. That the threat of NATO bombing was unlikely to cause Mr. Milosevic to accept the Rambouillet agreement. 2. That bombing would not solve the Kosovoproblem but make it worse. 3. That military action should not be taken against a sovereign country without United Nations sanction.
The first two points have proved absolutely correct. The third should give the United States and its NATO allies serious pause. Are we willing to concede to other military alliances a right to intervene at will outside their borders? To do so would seem exceedingly unwise.
But unless we do, how can we expect countries outside NATO to accept it as prosecutor, judge, juror and policeman of Europe? Is that its purpose? It would be different, of course, if the United Nations Security Council or the General Assembly had asked NATO to enforce a decision it had made.
Once again, we are finding that it is much easier to start a war than to end it. So much damage has already been done that any feasible solution now will be significantly worse than what might have been obtained by diplomacy without threats to bomb, or by diplomacy backed up with a credible threat to invade. But we cannot make effective policy on the basis of what might have been. We also cannot make effective policy if we are blinded by rage and frustration, however justified.
The United States must find the wisdom and will to lead the alliance away from the tragic quagmire that looms ahead if it stays on the current course of war against Serbia. So long as we make Serbia the enemy, rather than Slobodan Milosevic, the Kosovo problem will not be solved. Neither partition nor independence nor indefinite foreign occupation will work in the long run without the acquiescence of the Serbian people.
It should also be clear by now that there is no way to restore stability to the Balkans without Russian cooperation. President Boris Yeltsin’s pledge yesterday not to intervene militarily gives us an opening to discuss the shape of a settlement and Russia’s participation in it.
Other non-NATO countries can also be helpful: President Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine recently made proposals that should be taken seriously and explored. If the Kosovar refugees are to return and life is to be restoredto the rubble, policing by outsiders will certainly be required. NATO aloneis not capable of imposing a settlement that will last.
Stability in the Balkans must be treated as a problem for all of Europe and countries as important as Russia and Ukraine made part of the solution, not forced to be part of the problem.
Why not declare victory (we have seriously degraded Mr. Milosevic’s military potential, as we set out to do), end the bombing and welcome active Russian participation in reaching a settlement? Given what has happened, it certainly will not be easy, but let’s face it: bombing Serbia is not working.
Jack F. Matlock, a professor at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, is a former Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. He contributed this to the New York Times and can be reached at: <matlock@ias.edu>
© New York Times and Jack F. Matlock 1999
