Three hundred years ago both India and China, by world standards, were heavyweight economies. But even at their zenith they never considered going to war, as the Europeans regularly did. Neither do they today, even though one school of Indian strategists argue with no real evidence that China is India’s enemy number one, not Pakistan. They say that India had to develop a nuclear arsenal not because of a possible Pakistani threat but because of China.
Nevertheless, it is true that China has been raising its defence spending, especially on its navy (but from a very low base) – in sharp contrast to the days of Deng Xiaoping, the great economic reformer, who put China on its present high growth capitalist projectory, at the same time sharply cut defence spending.
China is active abroad – in Africa it has become its biggest investor. China, as its economy steams ahead needs more raw materials, in particular oil, metals and soya.
In Afghanistan China is mining for copper. It is building oil and gas pipelines to carry oil across the Caspian Sea and then across Kazakhstan. In Mongolia Chinese mining companies are hard at work. Moscow may be wary of the large number of Chinese settlers moving into its sparsely populated Far East, bringing timber and mining companies on their coattails, but if Moscow felt in anyway threatened it could cut off the immigration flow.
As Robert Kaplan argues in a recent issue of Foreign Affairs, this expansion is one of need and therefore Chinese influence is not in any way threatening. “China’s emerging area of influence in Eurasia and Africa is growing, not in a nineteenth century imperialistic sense but in a more subtle manner better suited to the era of globalization.”
Even so China is shifting the balance of power in the Eastern hemisphere. Aided by China’s favourable location on the map, Beijing’s influence is expanding from Central Asia to the South China Sea and from the Russian Far East to the Indian Ocean.
However, China’s military might although growing is many decades away from being able to stand-up to the US or Europe. It is not developing an expeditionary force.
It is doubtful it would miscalculate with India, as it did before, in believing it could incorporate contested Himalayan border real estate. China could be sucked into North Korea if the regime collapses in an effort to stabilize it. And that is about it.
What border disputes it has had it has settled, except the minor one with India. With Russia, the Central Asian republics and other neighbours peaceful settlements of disputes have been the order of the day. On land all seems quiet and is likely to remain so. But at sea, some strategists say, it is appears to be another matter.
It is suggested – not that anybody really knows – that Beijing considers the island chain of the Kuril Islands, Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines as potential flashpoints. It is already engaged in passionate argument with neighbours over the ownership of the energy-rich ocean beds of the East China Sea and the South China Sea, with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and with the Philippines and Vietnam over the Spratly Islands. However, two years ago China and Japan sealed a historic natural gas joint development deal in a disputed part of the East China Sea. It needs to be said loud and clear that if the US Senate would ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty, thus raising its status and breathing life into its dispute and arbitration procedures, most of these territorial disputes could then be settled.
China appears to have no plans for territorial expansion, apart from Taiwan which for a couple of centuries it has considered part of China, but which is heavily enough armed to deter any attack. Meanwhile, it appears to be making its peace with China. China also probably wants to make sure that it can dissuade the US navy from having a free run between this island chain and the Chinese coast
Hopefully war with China in our time can be safely discounted. No Western politician should allow themselves (and this includes India) to be put in a corner by either their military or their hard line strategists and feel compelled to increase their navies for what is no threat at all.
