Summary
A United Nations mission consisting of
Civil Affairs and Civil Police should remain in Eastern
Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium in the Republic of
Croatia, after its mandate expires on January 15. UNTAES,
the present mission, has achieved impressive results within
its very short period of work.
However, vital work remains to be done
to provide psychological security, reconciliation and the
provision of socio-economic development and equal rights and
opportunities for all citizens.
The OSCE, UN as well as international
and local NGOs should now give priority to the psycho-social
aspects of re-integration. Otherwise many Serbs may leave
and Croats not return. If so, the UN and the Croatian
government will have failed and we shall witness yet another
refugee catastrophe in the Balkans.
UNTAES had asked TFF to analyse and
help mitigate conflicts in the school sector of the region.
We conclude that there are still
serious problems concerning minority rights, democracy and
participation, language and biased textbooks, teachers’
security and overall psychological well-being. More funds
are also needed for reconstruction and employment-creation
to secure the desired two-way return of Croats and Serbs to
where they lived before the war.
There are very few signs of
forgiveness. There is a serious feeling of frustration,
insecurity and hurt amongst Serb teachers, students and
their parents that needs urgently to be addressed. Even
young Serbs who are Croatian citizens and want to stay are
highly uncertain about their future.
These problems are not insoluble if
future missions focus clearly on the human dimensions of
reconciliation and long-term community- and peacebuilding
and their staff be selected accordingly.
Below we have listed the problems and
suggest some initiatives that we think will be
helpful.
_________
The mission of UNTAES is the peaceful
reintegration of the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and
Western Sirmium into the Republic of Croatia. UNTAES has
exercised authority over this region through a basic
agreement of 12 November 1995 and through UN Security
Council resolutions 1037 of 15 January 1996 and 1120 of 11
July 1997 but the current mandate ends on 15 January 1998.
The UN Security Council will
decide any further role of the UN in early December. The
UNTAES mission must not be prematurely withdrawn. The human
rights and obligations of the Serbs of Eastern Slavonia
should be upheld. If a large number of the remaining Serbs,
around 80.000, decide to leave their country, the UN mission
will have failed. This requires continual monitoring.
International assistance must be made
available immediately to assist the Croatian government to
implement its national Programme on the Re-establishment of
Trust, Accelerated Returns and the Normalisation of Living
Conditions in War-Affected Regions of Croatia as announced
on October 2 1997. We are glad that Croatian President
Franjo Tudjman on November 21 suggested a UN Civil Police
mission remain for up to nine months.
However, we urge the UN to consider a
new mandate that from 16 January 1998 would permit at least
some Civil Affairs personnel to remain in the region
together with Civilian Police.
It is vitally important that this and
other missions include professionals in socio-psychological
development and community-building and that their mandate
focus on empowerment of the government, local authorities
and NGOs so that they themselves can sustain the process
when international missions are withdrawn.
The Transnational Foundation had been
requested by UNTAES to conduct a conflict-mitigation mission
to the schools in the UNTAES region. In November our team,
welcomed by the Croatian Ministry for Education and Sports
and funded by the Swedish government, analysed the conflicts
in selected schools, offered short seminars and planned
follow-up activities there in December with a view to stay
ceased with the matter in 1998.*
Below follows a short summary of our
findings and recommendations.
I. LESSONS LEARNED
* On the human dimensions.
UNTAES has achieved impressive results
within its very short period of work. However, while its
attention and that of the international community has been
on demilitarisation, technical matters and political issues,
the human aspects in the process of integration and
development of the region and of Croatia in general have
been overlooked. Serbs feel powerless, disillusioned with
the Croatian government and, to some extent, also with what
the UN has done in the field of socio-psychological
assistance. There is a serious feeling of frustration,
insecurity and hurt amongst Serb teachers, students and
their parents that needs urgently to be addressed.
* On democracy.
The Ministry’s vertical structure, lack of consultation and
a less-than-optimal information system seem to produce
insecurity and a fear of doing wrong bordering on paralysis.
It also decreases effectiveness. Principals whom we have met
with seemed to be people of good will and intention but
experiencing their situation as quite unpleasant, posed as
they are between teachers/students “below” and
regional-national ministerial authorities “above.”
* On human rights.
Serb students and teachers are now Croatian citizens but
they feel that their identity as Serbs is not being
adequately recognised and affirmed. The best way to teach
human rights is to create an environment and a school system
that produces a feeling for and satisfaction with rights;
this however, is far from the case in the schools we have
visited.
Rather, rules, directives, orders and
the system created is experienced as deficient, bordering on
potential future ethnic cleansing by bureaucratic means.
Most of this hits people of Serb/Yugoslav ethnic
background.
Students insist that they did not
cause the war, that the war has stolen the joy of their
childhood, and that their future lies in being reconciled
with their Croatian peers.
* On media
Anger is strongly felt about the very hostile anti-Serb
stories and rhetoric put out already within school text
books and broadcast by the media. Such hostile stereotyping
and extremely biased versions of the civil war may fuel
further violence and are entirely contrary to the agreement
signed by the Croatian government imposing a moratorium on
teaching about the war period.
* On readiness for
reconciliation.
The national program for trust-building seems to have
little foundation in the field. Regional and local
committees were being established during our mission, some
surprisingly staffed with members of the transitional
police. We have found little evidence of any deliberate,
focused effort to make Serb minority youth feel good,
welcome and respected as the Croatian citizens they are and
clearly want to be in the future.
* On knowledge and resources being
wasted.
The Croatian principals that have been imposed on
Serbian schools find themselves in an impossible situation.
This situation was not of their own making.
Many Serb teachers who can teach
Croatian because it is the same language and have lived in
Croatia for many years have had their contracts
discontinued. Serbs with FRY citizenship who taught in
Croatia before the war do not teach even where their
competence is needed and other (Croatian) teachers have not
arrived. The reason given is that they are not paid anymore
as they are not Croatian citizens. This victimises the
students and adds to ethnic divisions.
It would have been natural to
establish certain procedures for a transitional period of,
say, 6-12 months during which these problems could have been
solved in a more flexible, smooth manner.
Double citizenship providing “double
scholarship” would have been natural had students’
intellectual interests and future possibilities rather than
political considerations been given priority. Unfortunately,
FRY/Serbia is opposed to the principle of double
citizenship.
* On language.
The tendency to see Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian as two
increasingly different languages causes a lot of confusion
in the schools. This problem seems to be created by leading
authorities on both sides and prevents a feeling of sharing
problems and working together to solve them.
* On perceived insecurity.
Final year students are worried about their prospects of
graduating well next May due to uncertainties about
recognising their achievements with the previous school
curriculum, the need to adjust to the new Croatian
curriculum, the lack of text books, etc.
Too many we have met during these two
weeks express anxiety about the future. We have no reason to
believe that this is “Serb propaganda” given the way this
sentiment has been conveyed to us. There is anxiety about
who will guard their interests when the UNTAES mission
leaves on 15 January 1998.
It is not enough for the Croatian
government, nor for the international community, to assert
that the situation has improved over time (which it has),
neither to state that these citizens have no objective
reason to feel like that. The individual perception is what
counts, and it is – overall – not good. Fear and democracy
cannot co-exist.
* On evolving demographic
change.
It seems that the latter problems are related to the
Croatian government’s idea that displaced Croat students and
teachers will soon return to various areas while
simultaneously displaced Serbs will move back to their place
of origin in Croatia or leave for permanent residence
elsewhere.
However, the overall reconstruction of
towns, infrastructure and the provision of safe return and
safe residence at original places is currently inadequate
and is bound to take a long time. In addition, Croats do not
seem to be eager to return to the region.
Therefore, the establishment of a
presumed future ethnic composition of citizens, teachers and
principals in the present post-war reality is bound to
create tension, psychological insecurity and conflicts. To
establish Croatian management in majority Serb schools is an
example of this and should be replaced by a policy of
adapting the school situation to the overall real situation
in society as it undergoes change.
The present policy can be perceived as
indicative of an overall intention to have Serbs leave the
country. As we take for granted that this is not the
Croatian government’s policy, something must be done to
change this perception which is a serious obstacles to
overall reconciliation and might impair the image of Croatia
abroad.
II. WHAT CAN BE DONE
+ The interests of Croatia, its
leadership and all citizens would be served if more
sensitivity, generosity and reconciliation be given to its
Serb citizens both for its reputation and security within
Croatia and for its recognition as a democratic government
within the Council of Europe and the wider international
community.
+ Assistance should be offered to the
Croatian government on practical ways to implement a policy
of national reconciliation and trust building that would
involve training in conflict management and in the skills
and emotions of healing inter-ethnic relations after the
violence of the war. Such programs should include at least
the school sector and the media. Radio and television should
be oriented to instil tolerance, forgiveness and
cooperation.
+ Appropriate Serb principals should
be appointed to schools in which over 80% of the teachers
and pupils are Serbs. Croats should be appointed in less
senior roles including those of Deputy Principal.
+ NGO’s in Croatia especially in the
centres of higher education, Osijek and Zagreb, and
especially those concerned with human rights, peacebuilding
and reconciliation should be supported to intensify their
work for mutual understanding, trust and security between
Serb and Croat students.
+ Text books including those in the
Serb language and Cyrillic script should be issued urgently
especially to final year students. An agreement should be
settled with Serb teachers and students about the proportion
of the school curriculum devoted to Serb history, literature
and language.
+ Special attention should be given to
empowering young people to decide their own lives and
futures in a situation charged with hostile emotions that is
not of their making. Teachers and students must be helped to
form interest organisations and link up with others
throughout Croatia and internationally.
+ The moratorium on teaching about the
civil war should be strictly observed, whether it be through
history, literature, geography or any other subject. During
this moratorium textbooks and other materials must be
produced so that this period of history can be dealt with
later. The events of the civil war should be presented from
both Croat and Serb points of view and an assessment of
these events should be given also from both perceptions.
+ School books containing hostile
rhetoric against any group should be withdrawn
immediately.
+ An inter-ethnic council of national
reconciliation and trust building should be established
charged with responsibility of examining all teaching
materials and also stories disseminated by the media to
determine whether they contain material that would inflame
inter-ethnic tension. This council should have the right and
duty to appeal to the Croatian government and to the
international community about instances of racial
discrimination and inflammatory material in the expectation
that such malpractice will be stopped and the perpetrators
brought to justice.
+ Serb teachers should be given
opportunities for retraining and acquiring qualifications in
higher education to compensate for opportunities that were
denied to them during the war period and its
aftermath.
+ Training for everyone in the
educational sector in dealing effectively with conflicts and
problem-solving. Training efforts must address the real
situation in the school sector.
+ The school system should be
democratised and local self-government introduced.
+ It is urgently desirable that the
discussion move away from national issue towards essential
issues of pedagogy and education, that is to areas of common
interests among students, teachers, principals and the
Ministry.
+ Schools should be seen as centres of
social learning of human skills, as community centres for
all, and as focal points for the development of a culture
for peace in accordance with, e.g. the norms of UNESCO and
the Convention of the Rights of Children and
Youth.
+ The national and local
trust-building program committees should have at least one
member trained professionally in relevant subjects such as
social work, psychology, forgiveness or
reconciliation.
+ It is urgently needed that more
Croat students all over Croatia be given an opportunity to
experience what conflict-resolution and reconciliation
means. A winner mentality is incompatible with
reconciliation.
+ With a view to the post-UNTAES
period, some kind of government and NGO hotlines and
information network should be established between the field
and the international community.
+ Also with a view to the post-UNTAES
period, a well thought-through security for the region
should be established, preferably by means of
demilitarisation on both sides of the international border,
a fairly widespread NGO presence and a combination of OSCE,
Council of Europe and other presence of the international
community, coupled with elaborate consultative procedures
among actors in the region and the Croatian
government.
TFF team members were Kerstin Schultz,
Bachelor of Science in social work, Dr. Peter Jarman and Dr.
Jan Oberg.
