Wang Yuewei（王玥玮）
March 24, 2025
This is a chapter in a TFF anthology in the making
“If You Want To Understand China.”
Foreword, Introduction, Authors and Table of Content here.
How to treat others is a core issue in a nation’s foreign policy and a direct reflection of its moral tradition. Throughout history, the performance of Western civilizations and Chinese civilization has been different. When it comes to dealing with others, China insists on pacifism and coexistence, whereas the West adopts expansionism and interventionism. Pacifism and expansionism are neither inherently good nor bad; each has its own achievements and losses.
Pacifist China did not launch bloody colonial conquests despite its strength, but its conservative stance caused it to miss the Industrial Revolution. The expansionist West, through both violence and peace, spread modern technology and systems globally, but this often resulted in slaughter, plunder, and sometimes genocide in the colonies.
National fortune and the times rely on each other. In the 19th and 20th centuries, Western expansionism and interventionism were, to some extent, inescapable aspects of the global transition to modernization. However, in the 21st century, what the countries in the whole world need is independence, equality, autonomy, and peace. Countries need to find paths to prosperity suited to their own circumstances without being dictated by others. Therefore, what the world needs today is a new order of peaceful coexistence rather than the outdated habits of interference and hegemony.
2024 marked the 70th anniversary of China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Throughout these seventy years, China has developed a diplomatic stance of peaceful coexistence and respect for diversity, fundamentally different from the Western approach led by the United States. This unique diplomatic principle stems from China’s 5000-year-old traditional political wisdom. Historically, China’s domestic ethnic policy has been to “governing according to local customs”（因俗而治), and its foreign policy has been to “cherishing men from afar” (怀柔远人).
This tradition, advocating cultural relativism and pluralism much like modern anthropology, is rooted in the agrarian civilization’s inherent sufficiency and harmony, differing from the conquest and aggression seen in commercial and nomadic civilizations, which stemmed from their internal insufficiency. (1)
As China rises, hostility and smear campaigns against it have become mainstream in Western societies at both the state political and official media levels. Randomly accessing Western mainstream media often reveals deliberately chosen negative news about China – and even massive bogus news. In diplomatic contexts, accusing China of lacking democracy, freedom, and human rights has become routine and politically correct. However, these accusations are always selective reports, baseless rumours, and slander.
When Western media reports falsely and partially about China, Chinese students studying abroad often feel indignant and helpless, hence the saying, “The more you travel abroad, the more patriotic you become”（“越出国，越爱国”). In 2024, after China lifted visa restrictions for Western visitors, many tourists posted on social media about their experiences, claiming the China they saw was nothing like what Western mainstream media depicted. “China Travel” became a popular term on YouTube and TikTok. Despite this, these students are often criticized as “brainwashed by their homeland,” and these foreign tourists are suspected of being “paid by the Chinese government”.
However, in reality, since World War II, the US and NATO have initiated at least eight major wars, while China has spent the past 70 years assisting underdeveloped countries with their development. To this day, in the face of Israel’s genocidal actions against Palestinian civilians, China was the first to stand up, protecting Palestinian rights at the UN and consistently supporting their human rights and sovereignty in the General Assembly.
Conversely, countries that falsely accuse China of committing genocide in Xinjiang—accusations dismissed by UN investigators and genocide research experts time and again—deny the evident atrocities committed by Israel against Palestinians, claiming there is no genocide against Palestinians.
Why is it that criticizing and spreading falsehoods about China enjoy unfettered freedom of speech in the West while praising and recognizing China is seen as dangerous and heterodox, warranting suppression?
That is because China has taken a very different path from the West and yet achieved great success—without the need for colonization, slaughter, or war. This success is an economic miracle. China achieved a meteoric economic rise in the shortest time, elevating itself from poverty to becoming the world’s second-largest in terms of GDP. Furthermore, this success extends to democracy and public welfare.
While China does not practice Western-style one-person-one-vote democracy, its social class mobility, public opinion feedback mechanisms, power supervision systems, and civil servant selection processes are on par with, even superior to, those in the West. Additionally, public safety in China far exceeds that in the West, which is why the Chinese people continue to support a pragmatic, self-correcting government that brings both development and stability.
This was something the West did not foresee; the West had assumed that China’s economic development would lead it to follow a Western path, but instead, China became even more convinced that its unique path was best suited for itself after achieving economic growth.
Therefore, to the West, China is a different, and thus, threatening “Other.” Facing a nation that practices socialism and collectivism while achieving economic and political success and gaining the support of its citizens, Western media might fear that showcasing China’s success could inspire Western populations to challenge their own systems. To prevent this, the West needs to portray China as a “hostile,” “terrifying,” and “failed” other, thus using China as a negative example to avoid social revolution and maintain internal stability, reducing social mobility and preserving resources for vested interests.
This scenario is reminiscent of the movie “The Village” (2004), where the village elders scare the young with tales of monsters in the surrounding forest to keep them from leaving the village. The monsters were actually the elders in disguise, fabricated to maintain order within the village.
The Western mindset of establishing China as a hypothetical enemy stems from this logic: as China develops rapidly, it might become the world’s leading power, thus dominating the world and forcing others to abandon their own cultures and systems in favor of China’s. To preserve their identity, the West needs to ideologically attack China and frequently highlight its shortcomings in the media to emphasize the superiority of Western systems.
But does China really want to change the West as the West wants to change China?
To handle this question, the best approach for the West is not to rely on imagination or psychological projection, which only creates anxiety and incorrect judgments, but to understand Chinese history and culture to grasp the Chinese way of thinking and problem-solving, thus finding reliable answers to current anxieties.
Self-reform is something every country will experience and should actively choose. This is a law of social development. China is undergoing reform, and Western society cannot escape reform either. The question is, how to reform? Does reform mean that the stronger side will assimilate the weaker side, and the weaker side must erase its characteristics to conform to the stronger culture and system?
The Western answer to this question might be “Yes,” while the Chinese answer is “No.” This “No” is not from idealism but from realism shaped by long historical experience. Throughout China’s long history, whether in times of prosperity or not, the mainstream strategy in governance and ethics has not been predatory colonialism but a tributary system of reciprocity, not religious wars forcing conversions, but respect for local customs to achieve peace, unity, and harmony.
This is why China has been a multi-ethnic nation for thousands of years, formed by coexistence rather than a single-ethnic state based on language, bloodline, or religion. Chinese historical experience and Western historical experience are fundamentally different. Western culture’s historical experience with other cultures is primarily one of occupation and conquest, with ethical experiences derived from Christianity’s binary logic of “heaven and hell,” “the chosen ones and the abandoned ones”, lacking the historical experience and cognitive habits of using coexistence as a strategy for peace. They naturally find it hard to imagine that China, in its rising state, would still adhere to pacifism deeply rooted in its people’s hearts as a guiding principle for both external relations and internal ethnic policies.
This Western habit of projecting their own logic onto China is what Freud describes as “projection.” This mentality is a normal part of self-awareness but, if excessive, can lead to narcissistic disorders and their byproducts. To explain this using an ancient Chinese idiom: “Those who harbor ill intentions judge others by their own standards, thus suspecting others of ill intentions towards themselves”. (2)
The concept of “Zhong Guo” (中国, China) (3) can be traced back 3,000 years to the Western Zhou Dynasty (1046-771 BCE). In 1963, an inscription on a bronze vessel called He Zun (4) excavated in Baojo (宝鸡), Shanxi Province, mentioned “宅兹中国” (Zhai Zi Zhong Guo), meaning “reside in the Central State”. (5) At that time, Zhong Guo was not an empire yet but referred to as the Central State in the midstream of the Yellow River, roughly corresponding to the present-day Henan and Luoyang areas, which were the central regions of the Zhou dynasty among the vassal states.
When the Zhou dynasty overthrew the Shang dynasty and established feudal states, it faced the challenge of how to govern the diverse cultures of its vassal states. Should the Zhou li (周礼) (6) be imposed uniformly, or should the original cultural rites of each state be respected?
The Zhou dynasty quickly answered this question. After King Wu of Zhou defeated the Shang Dynasty, he enfeoffed Jiang Ziya in Qi and others in various states. Qi and Lu were not originally part of the central plains but were homes to the Dongyi（东夷) people, who practised their own cultural rituals. Jiang Ziya did not force these people to adopt Zhou rites but governed according to the principle of “adapting their local customs and simplifying their official rites.” (7)
This approach quickly won the support of the people of Qi, and many from other states moved there, turning Qi into a big state. This strategy of governing based on local customs was endorsed by the regent of Zhou and became a model for managing feudal states. While “governing according to local customs” did not force the states to learn Zhou li, it embodied the core morality of Zhou li, which advocated “ruling by virtue”（以德服人). (8)
The idea of “governing according to local customs”, advocated by Duke Zhou and Jiang Ziya, has been perpetuated in China’s external diplomacy and internal ethnic policies throughout its history. Following the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, the era of a unified China commenced. However, the unified Chinese Empire did not abandon this ethnic principle; instead, it further developed this approach.
During the Han Dynasty, Emperor Wu implemented a parallel system of province and state（郡国并行), allowing both central and local authorities certain degrees of autonomy to accommodate regional differences. In the Western Han Dynasty, Dai Sheng（戴圣) compiled the Book of Rites (《礼记》), which clearly records the following in the “King’s Regulations” (王制) chapter: “Improve their education without changing their customs; coordinate their government without altering their suitability. The people of Zhongguo, the people of Rong, the people of Yi, all have their inherent characteristics that cannot be changed”. (9)
Likewise, in the Tang Dynasty, the Confucius scholar Kong Yingda’s (孔颖达) annotations in the Correct Meaning of the Book of Rites (《礼记正义》）emphasized the same ethnic policy.
In terms of foreign relations, as the Central dynasties grew increasingly powerful, formulating and developing external strategies became a crucial theme in the political strategies of ancient Chinese empires. During the Qin Dynasty, in response to the northern nomadic Xiongnu, a strategy of primarily defence and supplementary aggression was adopted. The Qin emperor Qin Shi Huang built the Great Wall to minimize border frictions and conflicts to the greatest extent possible. During the Han and Tang dynasties, the policy towards border ethnic groups was one of “cherishing men from afar” through a combination of demonstrated power and benevolent measures.
This dual approach involved strengthening military defences while simultaneously enhancing relations with border ethnic groups through alliances, conferments, gifts, and intermarriages. Even with the repeatedly invading Xiongnu, the Han Dynasty prioritized peace, seeking to placate them through peaceful means whenever possible.
The Song Dynasty, in contrast to its more open and confident predecessors, adopted a more cautious and defensive stance when dealing with powerful northern ethnic groups. This was necessary to safeguard its territorial boundaries and protect its national culture. Facing the formidable Liao Empire to the north and following prolonged conflicts, the Song Dynasty aimed for stability and prosperity for its people by signing the Treaty of Chanyuan with Liao, establishing a relationship as “brotherly states.”
This treaty ensured over a century without large-scale conflicts between the Song and Liao, fostering economic and cultural exchanges instead. As a result, the Khitan people of the Liao Empire eventually integrated into the Chinese nationality, becoming one of the common ancestors of the Chinese people today. (10)
Although the Yuan Dynasty was a conquest regime, it still adopted policies of governance based on local customs and placation. Especially in Tibet, the Yuan implemented a system of “politico-religious unification” (政教合一), while in the Central Plains, it emphasized respect for Confucianism and Chinese literature. However, unlike the Qing Dynasty, which deeply learned and understood the Confucian ideal of ruling the world with benevolence and righteousness, the Yuan Dynasty continued to primarily follow a nomadic model of expansion and conquest. This reliance on military dominance rather than moral governance contributed to the Yuan Dynasty’s downfall in less than a century.
The Ming and Qing periods, by contrast, were times when the policies of governance based on local customs and the placation of distant peoples were further refined. The Ming Dynasty established the Tusi（土司) system, whereby local hereditary chieftains were allowed to rule in regions such as Yunnan and Guizhou while respecting their traditional customs. The Qing Dynasty extended this approach by setting up the Ili General in Xinjiang, adopting policies that respected the customs and religious beliefs of ethnic groups such as the Uyghurs and Kazakhs.
In Tibet, the Qing court recognized the religious authority of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, maintaining a governance method of “politico-religious unification”. (11) The Qing Dynasty’s policies and systems reflected a forward-thinking approach comparable to the modern one of “one country, two systems” and regional ethnic autonomy of modern China.
It is evident that since the reign of King Cheng of the Zhou Dynasty in the 11th century BCE, China began to implement modern-sounding strategies like “one country, two systems” and ethnic autonomous governance to maintain internal harmony. By the 2nd century BCE, during the Han Dynasty, China initiated a foreign policy of peaceful coexistence and non-interference, which continued through subsequent dynasties.
In contrast, the Western world from the 17th to the 19th centuries was still engaged in colonialism, emphasizing cultural and religious unification and resource exploitation, even implementing genocides against indigenous peoples.
This naturally raises the question: What constitutes an advanced nation? What defines a “civilized” country? While scientific and technological advancement, economic level, and public welfare are important facets, a more crucial aspect lies in how a nation has treated others over time – whether it treats others with goodwill and respect, which reveals the true depth of its morality and virtue.
Furthermore, throughout its long history, China has never adhered to the idea of racial purity. As Confucius stated, “Education knows no classes” (“有教无类”). Individuals from different ethnic backgrounds could learn Central Plains culture and compete on equal footing with Han scholars, gaining recognition as Chinese through cultural assimilation rather than lineage. This tradition embodies a form of anti-racist and egalitarian ethics far earlier than similar notions in the West appear.
Thus, long before globalization and modernization, China had already laid a rich philosophical foundation for today’s advocacy of “unity in diversity” (多元一体) and “harmony without uniformity” (和而不同). The policy of governing according to local customs complements the current system of regional ethnic autonomy in China. Similarly, the diplomatic principle of cherishing men from afar is reflected in China’s contemporary Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.
In contrast, the West, influenced by its long historical experience rooted in Christian ethics, has often viewed faith in God as the only truth, with all other religions, beliefs, and cultures considered heretical and doomed to hell. This ideological tradition of the West did not disappear after the dark Middle Ages, but evolved into colonialism in modern times and into the so-called “universal values” in contemporary age.
Such attempts to assimilate others inevitably cause internal anxiety and lead to conflicts and wars with others. A rising but non-expansionist China is perceived by the West as an “Eastern Crusader,” silently amassing strength for future expeditions. They cannot comprehend that China’s non-expansionism and non-interference in other nations’ internal affairs are inherent in its cultural traditions and cognitive patterns. They believe that China’s current restraint is simply a matter of timing, causing anxiety over China’s rise and projecting it as a formidable enemy, thus adopting adversarial diplomatic strategies and media narratives.
During the Qing Dynasty, we were unwilling to follow Western changes for two reasons: The traditional narrative had been that feudal power was decadent and declining, with no desire for change, especially not to let new things threaten their own power. This was indeed a fact.
However, there was also a cultural cognitive reason, which was that in Chinese thinking, “difference” was considered normal. The Qing people naturally thought that the West had its own way of doing things and China its own model, so there was no need to follow the West. However, when the West forcefully opened China’s doors, the Qing people realized in the harsh reality that the rulers’ naivety, laziness, and self-paralysis were leading China towards the danger of colonization. At that time, Social Darwinism was the mainstream Western values towards modernity, but China had not yet realized the brutality of this ideology.
After the country’s doors were opened and experienced plundering, the Chinese people understood the necessity to learn from the West, as they realized that “being backward meant being bullied.” Although this was not a moral value we adhered to, it was the social reality at that time. So, after going through a dark period, China began to learn from the West. There were two main debates on how to learn: one was to completely Westernize, and the other was to absorb Western ideas while maintaining our own essence.
Even today, there are still two contrasting voices in China: one advocating Western liberalism and the other supporting a path with Chinese characteristics.
From the end of the Qing Dynasty until now, China has been contemplating how to learn from the West, reform itself, leverage its strengths, and integrate Western virtues with our own. However, for the past two centuries, the West has never truly attempted to learn from the East. The so-called “Hippie Movement” was just one such attempt, resembling what Edward Said described as “Orientalism” – a Western fantasy and projection onto the East, rather than a rational, humble introspection into their own faults, followed by learning and understanding others.
Moreover, this mass cultural movement only touched upon popular culture, without impact on Western institutions or political spheres.
While China can learn from the West, it will always remain distinct and not identical to the West, and vice versa. Such differences are seen as natural and justified by the Chinese people. However, the West does not share this view. Consequently, they perceive China’s historical tribute system as a form of colonialism, interpret China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as interference, view Western-style elections as the only form of democracy, and see the close ties within Chinese families as a lack of independent spirit.
The West also struggles to comprehend that after achieving self-development and prosperity, China has no interest in cultural colonization or exporting revolutions. This misunderstanding stems from the Western power structures, which fear new developments that could challenge their position and a lack of historical experience in peaceful strategies within Western culture.
The ideal scenario should involve mutual learning and cooperation between the West and China for mutual benefit. China has learned industrial revolution and modern technology from the West, while the West could learn most from China when it comes to respect and tolerance for others and differences.
If Western society increasingly embraces education that includes “Let each one appreciate their own beauty, also recognize and celebrate the beauty of others, and together create a world of shared harmony and unity” (12), catastrophes due to the “Clashes of Civilizations” can and will be averted, and the dull homogeneous world depicted by the “End of History” will not materialize. Because, indeed, there is a possibility of a world of great harmony (大同世界) that embraces differences, seeks commonalities while respecting differences, and promotes peaceful coexistence.
Notes
(1) For insightful discussions on the concepts and culture arising from the inherent deficiencies or self-sufficiency of nomadic civilization, commercial civilization, or agrarian civilization, see 钱穆《中国文化史导论》.
(2) “积忮害者，以己度人，而疑人之忮己” （[清]王夫之《读通鉴论·汉高帝二》）。
(3) China is not the term that Chinese people use to refer to themselves; it is a name given by others. The self-designation of China, since the Zhou Dynasty, has been “Zhong Guo,” which means Central State. The boundaries and connotations of “Zhong Guo” have continuously expanded and been enriched throughout various dynasties with the growth of China’s territory and ethnic diversity.
(4) The inscription on this brone vessel is called “He zun inscription”（“何尊铭”）:“唯王初迁宅于成周，复禀武王礼，福自天，在四月丙戌，王诰宗小子于京室，曰：昔在尔考公氏，克达文王，肆文王受兹因（命），唯武王既克大邑商，则廷告于天，曰：余其宅兹中国，自之牧民。”
(5) See 葛兆光《宅兹中国: 重建有关“中国”的历史论述》，北京：中华书局，2011.
(6) Zhou li (周礼) is typically translated as “the rites of Zhou.” Here, the term “li” refers to a comprehensive system of social systems, ritual practices, governing regulations, morality, law, and ethics.
(7) 即“因其俗，简其礼”。司马迁《史记·齐太公世家》：“ 大公至国，修政，因其俗，简其礼，通商工之业，便鱼盐之利，而人民多归齐，齐为大国”。《史记·鲁周公世家》（又见《史记·齐太公世家》）： “周公曰：‘何疾也？’曰：‘吾简其君臣礼，从其俗为也’”。
(8) 《尚书·召诰》。
(9) “修其教，不易其俗；齐其政，不易其宜。中国戎夷，五方之民，皆有其性也，不可推移”。
(10) 《宋史》《契丹国志》。
(11) 《清史稿》。
(12) 费孝通（Fei Xiaotong）: “各美其美,美人之美,美美与共,天下大同”。
About the author Wang Yuewei
Two PhDs & Academic professional.
Postdoctoral researcher and associate researcher at Tsinghua Institute for Advanced
Study in Humanities and Social Sciences (TIAS, 人文与社会科学高等研究所 )), Beijing (2024- ).
Holder of a PhD. from École Pratique des Hautes Études Paris Sciences et Lettres, Paris
(EPHE PSL) (2023).
Holder of PhD from Minzu University of China, Beijing (2018).
Major: Language, Civilization and Oriental Studies (Spécialité: Langues, civilisations et sociétés orientales); Comparative studies of Tibet and China; Anthropology and Sociology of Tibet; Studies of the Ethnic groups of China.
